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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate the effect of family connections to politicians on individuals’ labor market outcomes. 
We combine data for Italy over almost three decades from longitudinal social security records on a random sample 
of around 1 million private sector employees with the universe of around 500,000 individuals ever holding 
political office, and we exploit information available in both datasets on a substring of each individual’s last name 
and municipality of birth in order to identify family ties. Using a diff-in-diff analysis that follows individuals as 
their family members enter and leave office, and correcting for the measurement error induced by our fuzzy 
matching method, we estimate that the monetary return to having a politician in the family is around 3.5 percent 
worth of private sector earnings and that each politician is able to extract rents for his family worth between one 
fourth and one full private sector job per year. The effect of nepotism is long lasting, extending well beyond the 
period in office. Consistent with the view that this is a technology of rent appropriation on the part of politicians, 
the effect increases with politicians’ clout and with the resources available in the administration where they serve. 
 
 
Keywords: nepotism, family connections, politics, rent appropriation 
JEL codes: D72; D73; H72; J24; J30; M51 
 
 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Community Programme. The Centre for Economic Performance 
is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
 
 
We are grateful to Stéphane Bonhomme and David Card for very useful discussions, and to seminar participants 
at the Bank of Italy, Berkeley, Bocconi, Cagliari, CEMFI, Collegio Carlo Alberto, EIEF, EUI, Goteborg, HEC 
Montreal, Munich, LSE, Padua, UPF, Tel Aviv, the CEPR Public Economics Annual Symposium, the 
RIDGE/LACEA-PEG Workshop on Political Economy and the Festival dell’Economia di Trento for many 
useful comments. Access to INPS data was performed is a secure lab environment to preserve data 
confidentiality. We are extremely grateful to Tito Boeri for facilitating access to these data and to Leda Accosta, 
Cinzia Ferrara and Giulio Mattioni for their help with the data. We are also grateful to Luigi Guiso for sharing 
with us some of the data used in this paper. Gagliarducci gratefully acknowledges financial assistance from 
UniCredit & Universities under a Modigliani Research Grant. We thank Ricardo Alonso, Antonio Cabrales, 
Wouter Dessein, Luis Garicano, Thomas Kittsteiner, Kristof Madarasz, Eiichi Miyagawa, Ignacio Palacios-
Huerta and participants at various seminars and conferences for valuable discussions and suggestions. 
 Marco Manacorda, Queen Mary University of London, Centre for Economic Performance, London 
School of Economics, CEPR and IZA. Stefano Gagliarducci, Università di Roma Tor Vergata and EIEF.  
 
 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in 
any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor be issued to the public or 
circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. 
 
 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the editor at the 
above address. 
 
 
 
 M. Manacorda and S. Gagliarducci, submitted 2016. 
1. Introduction
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that firms reserve a special treatment to politicians’ family
members.1 However, credible evidence on this phenomenon, let aside its determinants, remains
elusive. In this paper we combine micro data for Italy over almost thirty years on the universe of
around 500,000 individuals holding political office with social security micro data on a random
sample of around one million private sector employees in order to estimate the labor market
returns to family connections to individuals in office and provide a wider measure of the returns
to holding office.
Italy appears an ideal case study for our analysis. Since at least Banfield’s (1958) Moral
Basis of a Backward Society the roles of family ties, lack of trust and civic participation and
the associated incidence of nepotism and lack of meritocracy in shaping the fabric of society
and the economy have been long recognized, and they are often seen at the root of the coun-
try’s inability to modernize (Pellegrino and Zingales 2014, Putnam et al 1993). Alongside,
widespread red tape, a cumbersome bureaucracy, inefficient public and justice sectors, and a
pervasive control of politics over the economy create wide opportunities for corruption and
personal enrichment. The country ranks third from the bottom among OECD high-income
countries in the Ease of Doing Business index (World Bank 2014) and the highest among all
European countries in terms of the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International
2014).
One major advantage of the data that we have assembled is that they provide information
on individuals’ tax code, which in Italy includes the first three consonants (in short F3C) of
one’s last name and an identifier for the municipality of birth. We define “families” as groups
of individuals sharing the same F3C and born in the same municipality. Given the very high
number of highly locally concentrated last names, the high number of geographical divisions
and low geographical mobility this method has the potential to identify families with a high
degree of precision.
In order to identify the causal effect of a family member holding office on individuals’ la-
bor market outcomes we exploit the longitudinal nature of the workers’ data and the timing of
“family” members’ movements in and out of office, in the spirit of a differences-in-differences
analysis. In particular, we examine how workers’ earnings and employment change as individ-
uals with the same F3C and born in the same municipality assume or leave office.
Despite the very fine-grained partition of the data, our matching method clearly identifies
family connections with error, since not only does it fail to classify some connected individuals
as family members, but also it erroneously classifies some unconnected individuals as family
members. We show that misclassification induces a systematic downward bias in our estimates
and that one can use information on the distribution of F3Cs in the population - which we
1 Allegations of political nepotism against companies often surface in the press. One prominent recent case
involves the SEC’s allegations that “JPMorgan’s [...] hired the children of high-ranking Chinese officials to
help win business (Financial Times 2015).
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derive from auxiliary data - together with plausible values of the number of truly connected
individuals - which we derive based on simulations - to correct the estimates for measurement
error.
Our estimates imply that family connections to an individual in office yield an average mone-
tary return in terms of private sector earnings of around 700 euros per year (770 USD at today’s
exchange rate), approximately a 3.5 percent increase relative to a baseline level of private sector
earnings of slightly less than 20,000 euros. This is not much below the return to one extra year
of education in Italy (5.3, see Hanushek et al 2013). Using the benchmark estimate - that we
derive from simulations - of an average of six consanguineal close family members i.e., those
more likely to benefit from political connections, born in the same municipality, this yields an
average return per politician from holding office of around 4,200 euros worth of private sector
jobs per year.
These estimates are likely to be conservative as they exclude affinal relatives (as well as
relatives born elsewhere, which we ignore throughout). If these individuals also benefit from
connections, this number will need to be multiplied by a factor of four, implying a yearly
return to holding office as high as 16,800 euros, i.e., earnings worth almost one extra private
sector job per year per politician. Importantly, effects manifest precisely when an individual
in the family assumes office but they persist even after this individual leaves office, suggesting
not only sizeable but also long-lasting effects of holding political office on family members’
private sector careers.
We bring ammunition to the argument that our estimates genuinely capture nepotistic prac-
tices by examining the gradient in the estimated effect as a function of politicians’ clout. We
find that the effect is larger the higher the level of political office, the higher the level of gov-
ernment, and the longer tenure in office. Similar to Brollo et al’s (2013) and Dal Bó et al (2006)
claim that corruption increases when resources increase, we also find that nepotistic practices
appear to respond directly to the resources available to politicians, as measured by the budget
available to the administration where they serve.
Our paper relates and contributes to different streams of literature in both labor economics
and political economy. An established body of literature in labor economics focuses on - and
finds evidence in favor of considerable - intergenerational persistence in socio-economic status,
income and human capital, occupations - including political occupations - jobs and even firm’s
control (Bertrand and Schoar 2006, Black and Devereux 2011, Dal Bó et al 2009, Durante et
al 2011, Kramarz and Skans 2014, Solon 1999). A related body of literature in social sciences
uses last names to identify family ties (e.g., Angelucci et al 2010, Fafchamps and Labonne
2013, Guell et al 2014) or to measure intergenerational mobility and the concentration of fam-
ilies in specific occupations (Clark 2012, Clark and Cummins 2014, Durante et al 2011).
While, through the provision of insurance, information or mechanisms of contract enforce-
ment, family and other informal connections might provide a second best solution to market
failures, assignment of jobs and the availability of opportunities based on one’s name or con-
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tacts rather than one’s talent might come to the detriment of others, i.e., those who do not boast
such connections, potentially leading to a misallocation of resources in society and an overall
efficiency loss, a point often made in relation to the management of family firms (Bertrand and
Schoar 2006, Pérez-González 2006).
Low levels of mobility in socio-economic status across generations might also create in-
centives to divert resources away from productive investment, such as human capital, towards
rent-seeking activities, such as the preservation of family ties, impede geographical mobility
and risk taking, and overall reduce total output. Consistent with this view, there is compelling
evidence that stronger family ties lead to lower levels of trust, political participation and social
capital, lower economic development and poorer quality of institutions, including lower control
of corruption (Alesina and Giuliano 2014).
A branch of literature in political economy focuses on the private returns to holding polit-
ical office. Clearly, by the nature of their job, those in office have disproportionate control
over public resources and authority over legislative and administrative acts that affect others,
making it in principle possible to divert public resource for personal use or take decisions that
are ultimately in the private as opposed to the public interest. The private returns to holding
political office stem precisely from the specific rents associated to holding office. One direct
measure of the returns to public office is politicians’ pay. Borrowing from the literature on
incentives in managerial and personnel economics, a number of authors emphasize that in ad-
dition to the systems of checks and balances that characterize most modern democracies, in
primis elections, above-market pay can create a powerful discipline device, making politicians’
misbehavior costly and improving effort (Besley 2004, Ferraz and Finan 2011, Gagliarducci
and Nannicini 2013).
In addition to pay, there are other dimensions of the returns to political office. Not only
do ego rents or utility gains presumably accrue even to benevolent politicians from serving,
but holding political office might lead to powerful connections, put individuals in the “spot-
light”, hence revealing their quality (Mattozzi and Merlo 2008), or create opportunities for
rent-seeking - and even illegal - activities when the incentives not to misbehave are not suf-
ficiently powerful. Indeed, there is considerable evidence of substantial monetary and non-
monetary returns to political careers both while in office and after that (Cingano and Pinotti
2013, Diermeier et al 2005, Fisman et al 2014, Merlo et al 2010), including through the estab-
lishment of political dynasties (Dal Bó et al 2009).2 At the extreme, politicians can profit from
their position in order to engage in corruption and grafting, i.e., illegal activities in connection
to their office that yield a private utility (Banerjee et al 2012, Brollo et al 2013, Olken 2007,
Shleifer and Vishny 1993).
2 A related literature shows that, through pork mechanisms, clientelistic practices and vote buying, politicians can
use public resources to generate political support, and hence reap political benefits from their office (Alesina
et al 2001, Finan and Schechter 2012, Levitt and Snyder 1997, Manacorda et al 2011). A somewhat related
stream of literature focuses on favoritism along ethnic lines (e.g., Burgess et al 2013) or city of birth and city
of election lines (Carozzi and Repetto 2015).
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Connecting the literature on the role of informal and family ties with the literature on polit-
ical careers, others have documented that connections to politicians matter for the fortunes of
individuals, groups and organizations. A number of papers document that companies linked to
politicians or to ruling political parties - including through family ties - tend to perform bet-
ter, have greater access to credit and are more likely to escape the burden of bureaucracy and
regulation (see for example Acemoglu et al 2015, Amore and Bennedsen 2013, Cingano and
Pinotti 2013, Faccio 2006, Ferguson and Voth 2008, Fisman 2001, Khwaja and Mian 2005).
These links appear to be more frequent and more profitable in more corrupt environments,
providing indirect evidence that they might directly benefit politicians. Consistent with this
view, Bertrand et al (2007) show that firms connected to incumbent candidates engage in hiring
around the time of election, something that they ascribe to the electoral returns accruing to the
incumbent from such practices. These studies largely focus on connections to shareholders,
CEOs and board members and typically refer to small samples of firms.
Indeed, very few studies examine the individual labor market returns to political connections.
A few existing studies focus on political occupations (Blanes et al 2012 investigate the career of
US lobbyists, and Dal Bó et al 2009 focus on political dynasties). A paper that is very closely
related to ours is Fafcahamps and Labonne (2013), which investigates the effect of family con-
nections to local politicians - identified similarly to us through homonymy - in the Philippines.
Although they find no evidence of such connections having an effect on the probability of em-
ployment, they also find a positive effect on the probability of holding managerial positions and
an associated negative effect on the probability of holding unskilled manual positions, implying
that such connections might lead to higher wages. One drawback of this study is that it does
not distinguish between private and public employment, leaving open the possibility that most
of the effects found are ascribable to nepotistic hiring or promotions in the public sector, where
these decisions are under the - direct or indirect - control of politicians. In contrast, we focus
on the returns to connections in the private sector, where politicians have, at least in principle,
no direct control over hiring, firing and promotion decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data. In Section 3
we discuss the identification of the model, while in Sections 4 we present the regression results.
Section 5 finally concludes.
2. Data
2.1. Workers’ data
For the purpose of the empirical exercise, we use a workers’ micro data from the Italian Na-
tional Institute of Social Security (Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale, in short INPS).
These are matched employer-employee data that, for each year, record all employment spells
and the associated earnings for the universe of dependent workers in the private sector, hence
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excluding self-employment and public sector employment.3 Different versions of the same
data have been used extensively (see for example Card et al 2014, Cingano and Pinotti 2003,
Guiso et al 2005). The version of the data we use refers to a random sample of around 3 per-
cent (12/365, i.e., those born on the first day of each month in each year) of the population of
individuals with at least one social security spell between 1985 and 2011.
In addition to the number of months of work during the year and gross labor income (in-
cluding bonuses and premia) in each job in each year, the data provide basic job characteristics,
including occupation (in three broad categories: blue collar, white collar and manager) and sec-
tor of activity (at one digit level). Unfortunately, other than for an anonymous firm identifier,
no additional information is available on the firm.
Importantly, INPS data contain workers’ tax code (codice fiscale), which, in addition to
gender and date of birth, is a function of each worker’s first three consonants of the last name
(F3C) and municipality of birth.
Administratively, Italy is divided into 8,110 municipalities, 103 provinces (similar to US
counties), and 20 regions (roughly corresponding to US states). The data also provide province
(but not municipality) of work.4
The original data provide information on all employment spells during each year, where an
employment spell is defined by the interaction of employer X level of occupation. This means
that individuals can have more than one observation per year if they work for more than one
employer or if they change occupation. For computational purposes, we transform the data
so to have one observation for individual per year. We assign to each individual in each year
the total number of calendar months worked and total earnings in all jobs while we assign the
characteristics (i.e., occupation and industry) of the most highly paying job in that year.
In order not to confound the effect of family connections with the effect of one’s political
career on own earnings and employment, we also exclude from the sample workers who ever
appear in the politicians’ data set (see next section).
Overall, over twenty-seven years, the data provide information on around 925,000 individu-
als, with an average number of years in the data just over 10, i.e., a total of around 9.5 million
individual X year observations.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the workers’ data. Average real (at 2005 prices)
3 Since the mid 1990’s, a series of reforms have extended the mandate of INPS to include some categories of
self-employed workers and public sector workers. Our data only refer to those originally included in the INPS
fund.
4 The first three digits of a worker’s tax code correspond to the first three consonants of one’s last name (e.g.,
GGL for Gagliarducci and MNC for Manacorda). For women, there are derived from their maiden name. For
last names that contain less than three consonants, any missing digit is replaced with the first available vowel.
For last names that contain less than three letters, which is very uncommon, the missing digit is replaced
with the letter X . The remaining digits of the tax code are functions of the individual’s first name (three
digits), the day (two digits), month (two digits), year (four digits), and municipality (or country, for those born
abroad) of birth (3 digits), plus a control digit. The algorithm to compute one’s personal tax code is public
(http://goo.gl/MEFDlo). In the very rare case of two or more individuals with the same first 15 digits of the
tax code, the last digit is recomputed by the Italian Revenue Agency to guarantee a unique tax code.
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yearly earnings among those with a least one day of social security contributions during the
year are about 19,500 euros (around US$ 21,000), with workers working on average 10 cal-
endar months and holding 1.2 jobs in the year, either simultaneously or in different months.
Unsurprisingly, there are more men than women in the data, only a small fraction of workers
are in managerial positions, and a comparison between place of birth, place of residence and
place of work illustrates a steady migration flow from the poorer regions in the South to the
richer and more industrialized regions in the North.
2.2. Politicians’ data
We combine the INPS data with yearly data from the Ministry of Interior Affairs on the universe
of individuals holding political office between 1985 and 2011. The data refer to the universe of
individuals holding political office, at any level of government - local, subnational and national
- whether elected or appointed and whether in the legislative or executive branch.
In addition to the central government (composed by the two houses of parliament, the central
government and the prime minister), each geographical entity (municipality, province, region)
has its own local government, with both a legislative and an executive branch and a head of the
executive (mayor, president of province and governor of region, respectively). Each of these
different levels of government has authority over and responsibility for the provision of local
public goods and services, administrative authority over the issuing of permits and licenses,
and - with the exception of the central government - only modest power to levy taxes.
For each individual in office, in addition to the exact level of government, whether in a
council or executive position, date of assuming and leaving office (where the former is left
censored to January 1st 1985, and the latter is right censored to December 31st 2011), usual
occupation and highest education level, the data also provide each individual’s first and last
name, and hence the F3C, gender, municipality and date of birth. Importantly, we do not have
data on candidates other than those who are elected. The data also provide only imprecise
information on party affiliation or on whether an individual comes from a party that is part of
the ruling coalition.5
Overall, between 1985 and 2011 there are around 137,000 individuals in office every year,
for a total of approximately 525,000 individuals and average tenure (in the same or different
offices) of around 7 years.6
5 As individuals can hold more than one office simultaneously within the same government (e.g., council mem-
ber and local commissioner), we assign to each individual the highest office among all those held while we
treat the same individual simultaneously holding office in different governments (e.g., a mayor also sitting in
parliament) as two separate observations. For married women, there is no explicit rule stating whether they
have to use their maiden on their husband’s last name, although it is customary for most women to use their
maiden name.
6 The normal length of the legislature in Italy varies between four and five years, depending on the level of
government and the period considered. De facto, though, the duration of the legislature is often much shorter.
Since 1948, i.e., since the first national election, there have been seventeen elections and sixty different national
governments.
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Table 2 presents yearly average characteristics of politicians. The statistics in the table refer
to year X government X individual observations and each observation is weighted by the frac-
tion of the year in office. Not surprisingly, the greatest majority of those in office hold positions
in the municipal government, accounting for more than 96 percent of the observations. In con-
trast, national politicians account for less that 1 percent of the observations. Around 70 percent
of individuals are in council positions. The table also shows that politicians are disproportion-
ately males, they have relatively high levels of education compared to the population at large,
and many have professional occupations.7 A comparison between place of birth and place of
office shows that around 48 percent of municipal officials serve in their municipality of birth,
85 percent of municipal and provincial officials in their province of birth, and 92 percent of
municipal, provincial, and regional officials serve in the region of birth.
2.3. Matched workers-politicians’ data
We link workers’ data to politicians’ data based on municipality of birth and F3C. We discuss
in Section 4.7 the ability of this match to deliver reliable estimates of family connections.
We start by transforming the workers’ data the data into a yearly panel, with one observation
per year for each individual who is ever observed in the social security data. When an individual
has no social security record in a year, we assign zero earnings and zero months of work.
Next, for each individual in the INPS sample we compute the total number of individuals
in office carrying the same F3C and born in the same municipality, overall and by type (i.e.,
by level of government, office, gender, tenure, etc.). We restrict to individuals of working age,
i.e., not younger than 18 and not older than 65 born in Italy and we also exclude workers with
a frequency of the F3C in their municipality of birth (that we derive based on data in Section
2.4) greater or equal than 1,000. We do so in order to avoid very imprecise matches between
workers and politicians, and in particular to attenuate the consequences of type-2 error that
stems from classifying a large number of unrelated individuals to political families (see Section
2.4 and Appendix A.1).8
This delivers an unbalanced panel (due to the age restrictions) of around 800,000 workers
and 17 million year X individual observations. The average number of individuals with the
same F3C and born in the same municipality in office in a year is 0.4. This is clearly a large
number that reflects the fact that our fuzzy matching method identifies families with error. We
revert to this issue below.
7 For comparison, the fraction of the male labor force with a high school degree is 24 percent, while the fraction
with a college degree is 11 percent (Istat 2010).
8 This selection criterion leads us to drop around 12 percent of workers from the INPS data.
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2.4. Data on last names and F3Cs
We finally complement our analysis with cross-sectional data on the universe of personal tax
returns in Italy, which allow us to derive a distribution of last names by municipality. We use
these data to both validate our measure of family ties and, later, to correct for measurement
error.
One characterizing feature of Italy, due to its late unification and historical fragmentation, is
the very high number of last names (Caffarelli and Marcato 2008). Coupled with a high number
of geographical divisions (municipalities) and the low geographical mobility, this implies that
a matching based on municipality of birth and F3C has the potential to identify relatively small
groups. 9
The data that we use for this auxiliary exercise come from the universe of personal tax returns
in 2005, covering over 39 million individual taxpayers (out of around 60 million inhabitants).
Individual tax returns filed by all physical persons in Italy were briefly posted on line by the
Italian Revenue Service (Agenzia delle Entrate) in 2008 in an attempt to “name and shame” tax
evaders, before being removed under a public uproar.Although we do not have access to the
micro data on tax returns, we have aggregate data on the number of taxpayers by last name and
municipality of residence. This gives around 2 million distinct combinations (for comparison,
data for the USA report around 6 million last names, see Word et al 2008. In contrast, data for
China report only around 7,000 last names, see Liu et al 2012). After some data cleaning, we are
left with around 500,000 unique last names, and around 11.5 million last name X municipality
of residence interactions. This provides a measure, albeit error-ridden, of the distribution of
last names and F3Cs by municipality of birth.
The top panel of Table 4 reports the distribution of last names in Italy based on these data.
As in many other countries, this distribution is highly skewed to the right (column 1), with
200,000 last names having only one occurrence, and only one last name (Rossi) having more
than 130,000 occurrences. An average individual shares the same last name with around 5,000
individuals nationwide (column 3). Within municipalities of residence though, this number
falls dramatically, to about 72 individuals.
As said, the INPS data do not provide information on workers’ last name, but only on their
F3C. Moving from last names to F3C, entails some loss of precision, as the over 500,000 last
names in Italy only correspond to less than 10,000 F3Cs. Although this might seem problematic
for our analysis, the F3C is still a very good predictor of one’s last name within municipality.
This is shown in the bottom panel of Table 4. While nationwide an average individual shares his
last name with almost 79,000 individuals, within municipality of residence this number falls to
around 373. This is because there are on average 3 last names for the same F3C in each place
of residence, something that is shown in the last column of the table. In a separate analysis
9 Around 45 percent of Italians reside in the municipality of birth, 75 percent in the province of birth, and 85
percent in the region of birth (authors’ calculations based on the 2001 Italian Population Census).
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(available upon request) we show that the relative frequencies of cells in the INPS and tax data
line up remarkably well.
3. Econometric Model
3.1. Specification and identification
Having discussed the data, in this section we present the econometric model that guides our
empirical analysis. Let yiFmt denote labor outcomes (employment, earnings, etc.) in year t of
worker i with F3C F and born in municipality m, and let PiFmt be the number of individuals in
office at time t who are genuinely related to individual i through family connections. Ignoring
other covariates, our basic model is:
yiFmt = α+βPiFmt + εiFmt (3.1)
where
PiFmt =∑
j
diFm j pol jt ,
diFm j is a dummy equal to one if individual j is related to worker i, pol jt is a dummy equal to
one if individual j is in office at time t, εiFmt is an error term that we assume uncorrelated with
PiFmt , while β is the return to family connections to individuals in office, or, which is the same,
the additional outcome that each politician j generates among each individual connected along
family lines.
The model allows different politicians to benefit different individuals, and the same individ-
ual to benefit from multiple connections.
In order to identify β , in our baseline specification we include (103) province (effectively,
live-to-work areas in Italy) of birth dummies fully interacted with (27) year dummies (p X
t, with m ∈ p), and individual fixed effects, in order to account for individual time invariant
heterogeneity. We also include the few individual controls available in our data, namely age
and gender (where the latter is clearly identified only when individual fixed effects are not
included in the model). The estimate of β is based on a differences-in-differences strategy that
relies on a comparison of worker i from “family” Fm, before and after an individual in his
family assumes or leaves political office, relative to individuals belonging to “families” that
stay (un)connected over the same period.
As a concern remains that unobserved trends in family fortunes might simultaneously lead to
movements of a family member in or out of office and an improvement or deterioration in labor
market prospects of other members, hence leading a to spurious correlation between yiFmt and
PiFmt , and hence a bias in the OLS estimates of β , we provide a number of additional checks.
Using an event-study analysis, we investigate whether trends in labor market outcomes can be
detected prior to a family member assuming or losing office. We also experiment with very
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flexible specifications where we interact individual fixed effects with linear time trends or with
dummies for shorter sub-periods (2, 4, or 8 years) - hence avoiding to restrict latent trends to be
the same across individuals in the same local labor market. We finally investigate heterogeneity
along a number of dimensions, in terms of workers, politicians and jobs’ characteristics.
3.2. Measurement error
One issue with the estimate of equation (3.1) is that we do not have precise information on
the actual number of worker i’s family members in office. We proxy this with the number of
politicians with the same F3C F and born in the same municipality m as worker i.10
This implies that we only have an error-ridden measure of PiFmt . Measurement error arises
either because we fail to classify as connected some family members who have a different F3C
or municipality of birth (type-1 error) or because we classify as connected some individuals
who have the same F3C and municipality of birth but who are not family members (type-2
error). 11 In formulas our measure of the number of family members in office is:
PˆFmt =∑
j
siFm j pol jt
where siFm j is a dummy equal to one if individual j and worker i share the same F3C and are
born in the same municipality. 12
Our final regression model is:
yiFmt = α+β PˆFmt +uiFmt (3.2)
In Appendix A.1 we show that both types of misclassification (type-1 and type-2 error) in-
duce non-classical measurement error, and that the OLS estimate of β converges in probability
to kβ , where:
k = 1−Pr(diFm j = 1|siFm j = 0)−Pr(diFm j = 0|siFm j = 1)
This means that βˆ is bound between−β and β . This is because, in the extreme case when all
connected individuals are classified as unrelated and all unconnected individuals are classified
as related, the estimates of β will be reverted.
10 We prefer to use municipality of birth as opposed to municipality of election (for municipal elections) as this
is more likely to be exogenous to the decision of where to run for office. The concern here is that individuals
more likely to engage in nepotistic practices might seek office in municipalities with systematically different
characteristics. We interpret our estimates as intent-to-treat estimates that are free of this potential margin of
selection.
11 This is possibly aggravated by potential misspellings of politicians’ last names or misreporting of workers’ tax
codes.
12 Note that PˆFmt does not vary by i, as we attribute the same politicians to each individual with the same m and
F .
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In practice, this implies that it is sufficient to rescale the OLS estimates by the factor k
to correct for measurement error. In particular one can use, for each “family”, the number of
individuals with and without the same F3C by municipality (that we derive from the tax records
in Section 2.4) and the total the number of genuinely related individuals with and without the
same F3C (that we derive below based on simulations) to recover an unbiased estimate of β .
We revert to this in Section 4.7.13
4. Model Estimates
4.1. Main estimates
In this and the following sections we present estimates of the effect of carrying the same F3C
and being born in the same municipality of a politician on labor market outcomes. In Sections
4.2 and 4.3 we use a number of strategies to argue that these estimates carry a causal interpre-
tation. We also show in Section 4.4 how these estimates vary across politicians and in Section
4.5 how they vary across workers and jobs.
Table 5 presents main estimates of β in equation (3.1). Each cell corresponds to a separate
regression, while each panel refers to different dependent variables (months of work, and earn-
ings during the year, respectively), while separate columns refer to different specifications. In
particular, column (1) includes no controls, while column (2) includes F3C X municipality of
birth fixed effects, plus the interaction of province of birth X year dummies in order to control
for local labor market conditions. Column (3) additionally includes four age-groups dummies
plus a gender dummy. Column (4) finally includes individual fixed effects. Standard errors
in these and all other regressions are clustered by municipality of birth in order to allow for
correlated effects both within and between “families” in the same municipality.
By and large, the inclusion of additional controls leads to point estimates that are smaller
in absolute value but consistently positive and statistically significant at conventional levels.
Focusing on the most saturated specification in column (4), this suggests that one politician in
office increases yearly months of work of each individual with the same F3C and born in the
same municipality by 0.037 months (roughly 1.2 days of work a year, a 0.37 percent increase
relative to a baseline number of months of work of around 9.98) and an increase in earnings of
112 euros (a 0.57 percent increase relative to baseline earnings of around 19.500 euros).
For brevity, in the analysis we do not present regression results for the probability of em-
ployment. These are close to those obtained for the number of months of work in the year once
13 One additional concern is that, to be included in the sample, individuals have to have at least one social security
spell over the period of observation. This might lead to estimates that are affected by sample selection. The
bias stems from the fact that, assuming that β is positive, individuals with a politician in office sometimes
during the period of observation will have systematically lower values of the error term uiFmt , inducing a
negative correlation between uiFmt and PˆiFmt . In Appendix A.3 we show, using both theory and data, that this
effect is likely negligible.
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appropriately rescaled by the factor of 10, i.e., the average number of months in work among
those in the INPS data.
Taken together, this evidence suggests that most of the effects on employment come from
new hires (or lower quit rates) rather than increases in months of work among those already in
employment. It also appears that earnings gains are larger than employment gains (0.57 versus
0.37 percent). This suggests that either those who benefit from political connections enjoy
wage premia, or that these individuals are selected among those with high earnings potential.
4.2. Separate estimates for entry and exit and event study analysis
Estimates in Table 5, columns (1) to (4), exploit both politicians’ entry into and exit from
office to identify impact effects and restrict these two effects to be the same in magnitude but
opposite in sign. However, there should be no presumption that these two effects are the same
in magnitude, and much is to be learnt from separately analyzing entry and exit episodes.
For the effect of political connections to be truly causal, one will expect the effect on entry to
be positive. One will also expect this effect to manifest only upon a family member assuming
office, hence ruling out pre-trends, unless entry into office is anticipated, something that we
investigate in the next section.
Similarly, one will also expect this effect to last as long as a connected individual remains
in office, implying a negative effect precisely upon exit. The negative effect upon exit though
will be smaller than the positive effect upon entry if there is state dependence in employment
or earnings - whereby a job today leads to a higher probability of employment or higher earn-
ings tomorrow - or state dependence in political power - whereby those leaving office today
transition to other, perhaps more powerful, positions.
To investigate this, we have computed in each year and for each F3C X municipality of birth,
the cumulated sum of individuals assuming and leaving office since 1985, denoted respectively
by PˆinFmt and Pˆ
out
Fmt , and we have included these two regressors separately in the model. Clearly,
the difference between these two variables is simply the stock, the number of individuals in
office at any point in time PˆFmt , i.e., the regressor in columns (1) to (4) of Table 5.
Column (5) of Table 5 shows the estimated coefficients of these two separate variables. The
results show a positive effect of connections that manifests upon entry, of a magnitude very
similar to the one in column (4), and a small negative effect upon exit only statistically signif-
icant for months of work but not for earnings. Importantly, this is evidence that the effects of
nepotism persist after the period when a family member is in office.
In order to add transparency to our identification assumption and to investigate pre-trends
and possibly anticipation effects, we complement the regression analysis in Table 5 with an
event-study analysis.
We start by focusing on entry episodes. We restrict to individuals in the INPS data who
have at least one “family” member joining office between 1985 and 2011, i.e., we ignore never
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connected individuals. As individuals can experience multiple entries in office among those
with the same F3C and municipality of birth over the period, which greatly complicates the
analysis, for each individual we focus on the first entry episode in the period 1985-2011. We do
so in order in to avoid that previous entry episodes might confound our estimates. The concern
remains though that entry episodes before 1985 (which are not observed) or entry episodes
after the first one might still affect our estimates. A related concern is that entry episodes might
be correlated with exits. To deal with issue we show later that the first entry episode is a good
predictor of the number of politicians in office in surrounding years.
In the model, we only include observations in a 5-year window around the event. If by t1 we
denote the time of first entry in office for “family” Fm, we estimate the following equation:
yiFmt = α+
5
∑
t−t1=−5
βt−t1Pˆ
in
Fmt1 +uiFmt (4.1)
In practice we use the same model as in column (4) of Table 5, i.e., with province X year fixed
effects, individual fixed effects and age controls. As we can only identify ten coefficients out of
eleven, we restrict the coefficient in the year preceding the first entry episode (t− t−1 = −1)
to zero.
If our identification assumption holds, one will expect the effect at each lead (t − t1 =
−5, ...,−2) to be equal to zero. This will rule out anticipation effects. One will also expect
effects to manifest precisely at the year of entry (t = t1), and possibly to increase over time as
those in office acquire more power. One will finally expect the effect to decline after a number
of years as individuals gradually leave office.
Estimated coefficients for yearly earnings, together with 95 percent confidence intervals,
are reported in Figure 1 (a similar picture for months of work is reported in Appendix Figure
A.1). A vertical line refers to the year of first entry (time t1, i.e., at lag 0). Indeed, one can
verify that, prior to entry, there is no trend in labor market outcomes. This evidence rules out
that anticipation effects or spurious a correlation between a family’s labor market and political
fortunes. One can also see that the estimated coefficients become positive exactly at the time of
year of entry, they increase over time, presumably as politicians establish themselves, and they
start to decline precisely after four years. i.e., towards the end of a normal term.
As said, a concern remains that an entry episode might not be a good predictor of the actual
number of family members in office in nearby years. This happens for example is a politician’s
entry into office is systematically associated to an exit, implying that there would be no effect
on the total stock of individuals in office in the family. A related concern is that in equation
(4.2) we have included, for each observation at time t, only the entry episode at time t1, while
obviously that same observation might also be influenced by entry episodes occurring at other
times.
In order to address both of these concerns, in Appendix Figure A.3, we report results from a
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similar regression to (4.1), where now the dependent variable is the number of family members
in office at time t. One can see that the first entry episode is a strong predictor of the number
of family members in office in the following years, with a coefficient close to one after entry,
suggesting that state dependence in political office or omission of other entry episodes are not
sources of major concern. One can also see that the number of politicians in office declines
precisely five years after entry, consistent with political terms being typically four years.
In Figures 2 and A.2 we examine politicians’ exit from office and, similarly to entries, we
run the following regression:
yiFmt = α+
5
∑
t−tN=−5
βt−tN Pˆ
out
FmtN +uiFmt , (4.2)
where with tN we denote the time of last exit from office for “family” Fm. Again, we focus on
the last exit episode in order to limit the possibility that subsequent exits might confound our
estimates.
Similar to what found for entry, we find evidence of this exit episode being a clear and signif-
icant predictor of the number of politicians in office in surrounding years (see Appendix Figure
A.4). However, differently from what found for entries , there is evidence of a deterioration
in outcomes predating the time of exit, which continues after the time of exit itself. This also
explains the small and insignificant effect upon exit in column (5) of Table 5. We take this
evidence to suggests that exist are somewhat anticipated (which is reasonable given the normal
length of a term) and that perhaps they capture some declining trends in family fortunes. This
in turn suggests that exit episodes might not be as exogenous to the outcome variable as entry
episodes and one should exert some caution in interpreting estimates on exit as truly causal.
4.3. Robustness checks
Before proceeding further, in this section we discuss briefly a number of robustness checks
aimed at corroborating the analysis. We revert to a specification were we constrain the effect
of entry and exit to be the same but of opposite sign, and we focus on the most saturated
specification, as in column (4) of Table 5.
In column (1) of Table 6 we restrict to workers ever connected, i.e., with at least one family
member in office during the twenty-seven years period. Identification is based on differential
timing of entry or exit into and from office across groups. By restricting to those ever connected,
one hopes to limit the concern that those connected have different latent trends in labor market
status from those unconnected that might happen to be correlated with their families’ political
fortunes. This sample selection criterion reduces the sample by almost 50 percent but results
are very similar to those found in Table 5.
Results also remain virtually unchanged once we include the interactions of individual fixed
effects with a linear time trend in column (2) that capture gradients in employment and earn-
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ings across individuals that might be correlated with the number of family members in office.
In columns (3) to (5) we include respectively dummies for 8, 4 and 2 years sub-periods inter-
acted with individual fixed effects. Effectively, we allow individuals to have differential non-
parametric trends in local labor market outcomes. Note however that identification relies on
increasingly close observations around the time of entry or exit of a family member into/from
office, hence leading to less precise estimates. Point estimates fall in magnitude compared to
those in Table 5, but remain positive and statistically significant at conventional levels. Results
(not reported) also show that our estimates are insensitive to the start years used to mark the
beginning of each 8-years, 4-years and 2-years time interval.
We have also performed a number of additional robustness checks (not reported but available
upon request). First, we show that coefficients remain statistically significant at conventional
levels if we cluster standard errors at the level of province as opposed to city of birth. Estimates
also remain unchanged if we include among the regressors the interaction between province of
residence (in addition to province of work) and year fixed effects, or if we further include in
the model the interaction between F3C and year fixed effects.14
4.4. Politicians engaging in nepotism
Having ascertained that our estimates are robust to the specification used, this section explores
to the differential effect of political connections based on the characteristics of politicians and
the office they hold. If the effects we find are genuinely due to nepotistic practices, one will
expect these to be stronger the greater the rents accruing to a politician’s office.
We present regression estimates in Table 8 where, again, we revert to the specification in
Table 5, column (4). Columns (1) to (3) report respectively separate estimates on the number
of family members in office in council and executive positions, on the number of politicians
by number of consecutive terms in the same office (1 term, 2 terms or more) (including the
number of individuals in office in 1985 to control for the left censored nature of the data) and
on the number of politicians at different levels of government (municipal, provincial, regional
and national).
The table illustrates that more powerful politicians tend to generate higher labor market re-
turns among their family members. Column (1) shows that those in the executive positions
(whether commissioners in municipal provincial or regional governments, or ministers in the
central government, or heads of the executive) generate returns that are around 30 to 50 percent
higher than those in council positions. We take this as evidence of those in the executive having
14 We have also estimated regression coefficients from a model where we include (8,110) municipality of birth
X (27) year fixed effects. This allows us to control for the state of the labor market at a very localized level.
By including municipality (as opposed to province) of birth X year fixed effects, though, our control group
includes individuals with a different F3C in any given municipality (as opposed to any given province). This
exacerbates type-1 error (see equation A.1 in the appendix). Indeed, the inclusion of municipality of birth X
year fixed effects reduces the point estimates sensibly (a 5-fold reduction for earnings and 30-fold reduction
for months of work) although the effects remain positive and typically significant.
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more direct control over resources and hence being able to appropriate larger rents.
Column (2) shows that the returns to those connected to individuals in office for 2 terms or
more are around three times those found among those connected to politicians in office only
in one term. This is evidence of the returns increasing with tenure, although it is possible that
those with longer tenure are more powerful or able politicians, including those more able to
appropriate rents for themselves and their families (Coviello and Gagliarducci 2013).
A similar positive gradient is found among politicians at higher levels of government (e.g.
regional) compared to those at lower levels (e.g. municipal), at least as long as earnings are
concerned, although results other than for municipal politicians are typically imprecise, which
is unsurprising given that most politicians are municipal ones.
In sum, there is clear evidence of the effects of connections displaying a positive gradient
in politicians’ clout, which lends further support to our interpretation of the coefficients as
measuring rent extraction on the part of politicians.
4.5. Jobs created and workers benefitting from nepotism
Having characterized the type of politicians more prone to engage in nepotistic practices, in this
section we finally focus on the characteristics of jobs created and the individuals who benefit
from them. Table 7 explores the differential effect of political connections by jobs and workers’
characteristics. In columns (1) to (3) we investigate the type of jobs accruing to politicians’
family members. We run separate regressions for earnings and the number of months of work
and by specific occupation (blue collar, white collar and manager). 15
There is evidence that the effects decline the higher the occupation: for example political
connections are responsible for an additional 44 euros worth of blue collar earnings and 0.029
months of blue collar employment. The same figures for managers are 27 euros and 0.002
months of work. Effects, however, are proportionally higher the higher the occupation. As
shown in the Table, an average individual in the INPS sample for example makes 4,804 euros
of blue-collars’ earnings and only 453 euros worth of managers’ earnings. These results suggest
that jobs created by politicians are disproportionately high-paying jobs. This is likely to explain
why we find effects on earnings that are proportionally higher than for months of work (see
Table 5).
Unfortunately, with the data at hand there is no way of ascertaining whether these jobs get
dispensed to workers with higher than average skills, or whether those acquiring jobs through
political connections enjoy wage premia. There is evidence from other papers though that in-
formal connections are particular valuable, and hence more frequently used, among those with
poorer labor market prospects and lowers skills (Pistaferri 1999, Kramarz and Skans 2014).
We also investigate whether any heterogeneity exists by age (effectively the only individual
15 Note that coefficients do not add precisely to those in column (4) of Table 5 due to a small number of observa-
tions with missing occupation.
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characteristic that is available in our data). Using the same specification as in column (4) of
Table 5, in column (4) we interact the effect of the number of total politicians in office by
F3C and municipality of birth with workers’ age. Estimated effects are positive for younger
individuals and they tend to decline with age. Interestingly, the estimated effect on earnings is
negative for individuals 55 or older, on the order of -226 (-298+72) euros. Possibly this is due
to earlier transitions to retirement, or to transitions to other sectors (the public sector or even
political careers) as a result of political connections.
A concern remains that some firms in the INPS data, even if belonging to the private sector,
are publicly owned. Most of these firms are owned by municipalities, typically operating as
providers in the utilities and transport sectors.16 Although this would not invalidate our esti-
mates above, the concern remains that a positive coefficient is driven by the direct control that
politician, and in particular municipal politicians, exert over firms’ hiring. Although, as said,
we have very little information on firms’ characteristics (as their identity is concealed in the
data), we have, information on the firm’s sector of activity, although only at one digit level (9
sectors). For ease of reading, in Figures A.5 and A.6 we report the proportional increase in
yearly earnings and months of employment due to nepotism, by sector. One can see that effects
are similar across sectors (on average 0.1 percent) and there is no evidence that these effects
are larger in the energy sector. If anything, it appears that the effects are more pronounced in
manufacturing.
In sum, it appears that politicians allow preferential access to jobs that are better than the
average job, and that younger workers are those who most benefit from these connections. The
effect is roughly uniform across sectors, implying that this phenomenon is pervasive in the
economy.
4.6. Local budget and nepotism
Having ascertained that nepotism is a pervasive phenomenon in Italy and that it varies as a
function of a politicians’ clout, in this section we provide a tentative estimate of the fraction of
public resources that are siphoned by politicians through nepotistic practices. In particular, we
exploit the heterogeneity in the estimated effects and the public budget across municipalities to
identify this parameter.
In order to perform this exercise, we follow a two-step procedure. We start by estimating a
separate parameter βm in equation (4.2) for each municipality.17
16 Traditionally, state controlled companies operated largely in the transport and communication sectors (e.g.,
railways, telecoms), finance (banking) and in specific manufacturing (e.g., steel and airplanes) and energy
(e.g., oil) sectors of strategic relevance. Over the course of the 1980s and early 1990s, most of the ownership
of these firms though changed from being public to private.
17 In formulas, we estimate the following model: yiFmt = α+βmPˆFmt +uiFmt . As the model includes province X
year effects, in order to ease the computational burden, we run separate regressions for each of the 103 Italian
provinces, where we include year fixed effects (plus all other controls, namely individual fixed effects and age
group dummies) and we interact the variable PˆmFt with a dummy for each municipality m. Again, we cluster
standard errors by municipality of birth.
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In a second step we regress these municipality-specific measures of nepotism on municipality-
level variables with weights equal to the reciprocal of the square of the standard error of each
coefficient, in the spirit of a minimum distance estimator (see for example Card and Lemieux
2001 for an application). In formulas, we estimate the following model:
βˆm = δ0+δ1Zm+ vm (4.3)
where Zm denotes is a measure of public resources per politicians. As we exploit cross-
municipality variation in local budget, we restrict to the effect of municipal politicians only.
However, we have shown above that most of the effects of nepotism are indeed ascribable to
municipal politicians.18
In order measure the resources available to those in office we use public expenditure per
politician (in logs). We restrict to a measure of discretionary expenditure, defined as total
expenditure net of debt service and personnel, as this is easier and hence more likely to be
used to foster nepotistic practices. We have also experimented with other measures of the
local budget (total expenditure and total revenues per politicians). Results (not reported) are
qualitatively similar but they are less precise.
Column (1) of Table 9 presents estimates of equation (4.3) with no additional controls. These
and all other regressions are restricted to the municipalities with non-missing values of all
included regressors. It appears that a 10 percent increase in resources per politician leads to an
increase in the estimated coefficient of 19 euros (=190.078 X 0.1) for earnings and 0.06 (=0.064
X 0.1) for months of work, roughly a 20 percent increase compared to the main estimates in
Table 5.19
As, clearly, the amount of discretionary spending is not randomly allocated across munici-
palities and some determinants of spending might exist that are correlated with the amount of
nepotism, we include in the model a large number of observable municipality-level character-
istics.20
18 Out of the 8,100 municipalities in the country, we are able to identify separate coefficients for 7,182 of
them. This is because, for the residual 918 municipalities, not enough observations are available to iden-
tify a municipality-specific coefficient. As a robustness check we have run the pooled regression in Table 5,
column (4) on this restricted sample of 7,182 municipalities. Results (not reported but available upon request)
are remarkably similar to those obtained for the entire sample.
19 Note that, for politicians, we use the characteristics of the municipality of birth (as opposed to the one of elec-
tion). Not only does his greatly simplify the empirical analysis, but it also has the advantage of circumventing
the potential non-random allocation of those in office across districts. The concern here is that those with
stronger propensity to engage in nepotistic practices might seek office in areas where the return to this activity
is higher or where discretionary spending is higher. In this sense, our estimates can be interpreted as intent-to
treat estimates of the effect of local resources on the incidence of nepotism. Separate regressions show that
discretionary expenditure in the municipality of birth is a strong predictor of discretionary expenditure in the
municipality of election, with a coefficient in a log-log regression of 0.58. This is consistent with the fact that
around 50 percent of local politicians serve in their city of birth.
20 These are measures of local economic conditions and of the state of the labor market, namely log income
per capita, the log number of firms per capita, the fraction of workers in the public sector and the local
unemployment rate. We also control for log total number of politicians, log local population, the fraction of
population with a college degree, the fraction of the population that is past working age, plus dummies for
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If anything, the inclusion of municipality-level controls leads to estimates, in column (2),
that are larger than estimates with no controls in column (1) by between 30 and 42 percent,
respectively for earnings and months of work. This suggests that, if anything, determinants of
greater discretionary spending are associated to lower nepotism and that the estimates in col-
umn (1) are conservative. Finally we include in the model province fixed effects. Identification
is across municipalities with the same characteristics within each of the 103 provinces. Once
more, point estimates increase when we include these additional controls.
In sum, these results confirm that greater resources under the control of politicians happen
to lead to grater incidence of nepotism. In the following section we revert to these estimates
in order to derive back of the envelope calculations on the amount of discretionary spending
appropriated by politicians through nepotistic practices.
4.7. Assessing the extent and consequences of measurement error
Having ascertained that the estimates of the parameter of interest are causal, in the sense that
they present causal estimates of the effect of being born in the same municipality and carrying
the same F3C as one individual in office and having presented heterogeneity in effects across
a number of dimensions, we now present calculations on the returns of genuine effect of being
related to a politician via family ties. These calculations are tentative, as they are based on
a number of assumptions. Still, they should allow us to recover a sense of the magnitudes
involved.
Equation A.1 illustrates that given that type-1 error is overall negligible, in order to correct
our estimates of measurement error we simply need to rescale our estimated coefficients by
the ratio of the number of truly related individuals with the same F3C and the total number of
individuals with the same F3C, whether related on unrelated.
For each family we can derive an estimate of the denominator of k using the tax data (see
equation A.1).
In order to derive an estimate of the numerator, we have simulated the average number of
working age relatives for a middle aged individual (i.e., somebody of parenting age but too
young to have grandchildren and too old to have working age parents) (see Appendix A.2).
Under a range of plausible assumptions about the number of children born by generation and the
rate of geographical mobility, we predict an average number of close consanguineal relatives
(children, siblings, nephews and nieces, first cousins and their children - i.e., the ones who
whether a municipality is a region or province capital. We control for potential deterrence effects by including
dummies for whether them municipality has a police station (separately for the three police forces in Italy,
Carabinieri, State Police and Guardia di Finanza) and for whether this is a site of a judicial court. Finally,
in order to proxy for different level of social capital across areas (see Guiso et al 2004) we include a measure
of turnout in local elections, log number of non-profit associations per capita, and a dummy for whether
the municipal administration was ever dissolved for Mafia (see Acconcia et al 2014), which proxies for the
presence of organized crime. Precise sources and definitions together with descriptive statistics are presented
in Appendix A.4 and Table A.1.
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are possibly more likely to benefit from political connections) carrying one’s last name and
born in the same municipality on the order of 2.5. We also estimate a total number of close
consanguineal relatives, whether carrying one’s last name or not, born in the same municipality
of around 6.
Once we average this ratio across all individuals in the INPS data, this gives an estimate for
the implied bias (k) of 0.16.21
Reverting to our main estimates in Table 5 (but a similar rescaling can be applied to the other
tables), this suggests a rise in earnings associated to one extra family member in office on the
order of 700 euros per year (112/0.16) (i.e., 3.5 percent based on average earnings of 19,500
euros) and a rise in the number of months of work of around 0.23 (0.037/0.16, a 2.5 percent
increase relative to a baseline or around 10 months).
We can also attempt to derive estimates of the overall number of private sector jobs and the
wage bill ascribable to nepotism. Given the above estimates, and assuming that all close con-
sanguineal family members - whether carrying the last name or not - born in one’s municipality
benefit from these connections, this gives an estimate of the return to holding political office on
the order of 4,200 (700 X 6) euros and 1.3 months of work per year.
These estimates are likely to be conservative as they exclude affinal relatives, i.e., spouses of
consanguineal relatives as well as consanguineal and affinal relatives of one’s spouse born in
the same municipality (as well as close relatives born elsewhere, that we ignore throughout).
If these individuals also benefit from political connections, the numbers above will need to be
multiplied by a factor of 4, implying a yearly return to holding office as high as 16,800 euros,
i.e., approximately the monetary return to 0.85 jobs, and 5.2 months of work.
As there are approximately 137,000 individuals in office per year, and each politician gener-
ates between 0.13 and 0.52 jobs,22, this implies that at least 18,000 and as many as 71,000 jobs
per year can be ascribed to political nepotism along family lines. This is between 0.18 and 0.67
percent of private sector employment in INPS (around 10 million workers). Similar figures for
earnings imply that nepotism accounts for between 0.30 and 1.18 of the total wage bill in INPS.
We can also use the numbers in the previous section to derive a tentative estimate of the
amount of resources that politicians divert through nepotistic practices. Using the most conser-
vative estimate of the effect of discretionary spending on nepotism in Table 9, we calculate that
21 Although one could simply rescale the number of politicians in each family by the relevant factor k for each
family to obtain an unbiased estimates of β , we prefer not to do so as both the numerator and the denominator
of k are measured with error. Recall in particular that the tax data only provide the distribution of last names
by municipality of residence rather than the municipality of birth. This implies that we can only derive an
imperfect measure of the actual number of individuals in one’s municipality of birth with the same F3C. An
additional complication is that we only have information on the universe of taxpayers. These include a large
number of individuals out of the labor force, importantly pensioners. We hence correct the denominator by a
factor 0.64, which is the fraction of total labor force over the number of taxpayers. Estimates of the labor force
are on the order of 25 million - see Istat (2010) - compared to a number of taxpayers of around 39 million. For
this reason we prefer to compute an average k across all families.
22 This is between 1.3 and 5.2 months of work divided by 10, which is the average number of months of work
during the year
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politicians appropriate at least 4 percent of discretionary spending through these practices.23
5. Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we estimate the effect of family connections to public officials on private labor
market outcomes in Italy. Although there is plenty of anecdotal evidence on practices of fa-
voritism in hiring and promotion of public officials’ relatives, credible evidence is by and large
missing. This is because identifying individuals who are related to those in office is challeng-
ing in large enough data samples that are required to identify these effects with reasonable
precision.
We circumvent this problem by exploiting a unique piece of information that is available in
our data on individuals’ municipality of birth and a substring of three characters that compose
their last name (F3C), forming part of a worker’s tax code. Importantly, although we cannot
precisely identify individuals in the data, as we have no precise information on their last names
- let aside on their degree of relatedness to politicians - the data allow us to match politicians
and workers based on similar last names and place of birth. We show that this method has the
potential to identify relatively small groups of individuals, hence offering some promise about
its ability to identify, albeit imprecisely, family connections, We discuss at length the conse-
quences of measurement error induced by misclassification and we provide a simple method to
correct for it.
Based on this method, our estimates imply that the average individual monetary return to
political connections is on the order of 3.5 percent per year. Assuming that all close consan-
guineal family members born in one’s municipality benefit from these connections, we estimate
a return to holding political office on the order of 4,200 euros and 1.3 months of work per year,
an effect that is four-fold when we also include affinal relatives. Back of the envelope calcu-
lations suggests that jobs acquired through nepotism account for at least 0.2 to 0.7 percent of
private sector employment in Italy and between 0.3 and 1.2 of the total private sector wage bill
and that politicians appropriate at least 4 percent of the local discretionary budget to fund this
practice.
We take the evidence in the paper that the estimated effect increases with a politician’s clout
and with the resources accruing to the administration where he serves to indicate that nepotism
is a technology of rent appropriation that helps politicians monetize over their position of power
23 To get to this number, we use the estimate in column (1), row (1) of Table 9. This implies that a 10 percent
increase in discretionary expenditure per politician, around 30,000 euros, leads to an increase in earnings
among those with the same F3C and born in the same municipality of around 19 euros (190.078 X 0.1).
Correcting for measurement error, this gives an increase of about 119 euros per family member (19 /0.16).
Assuming that at least 6 family members benefit from this practice, this is 712 euros worth of private sector
earnings. Correcting for the fact that these are ITT estimates (see footnote 19), this gives an effect of 1,228
euros. These estimates imply an effect of around 4 percent of the discretionary budget 1,228/30,000. Results
can be significantly larger if one is willing to assume that politicians benefit more than four family members
or if one accepts the less conservative estimates in columns (2) and (3) of Table 9.
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and a wider measure of the returns to holding office.
Although the available data do not allow us to investigate this directly, we speculate that
nepotism is the result of an exchange between firms and politicians (as in Shleifer and Vishny
1994). The question though remains of why politicians resort to the triangulation of private
firms to monetize over their position of power. Although direct appropriation of resources is in
theory always an option, this is clearly risky. In addition, many of the rents associated to public
office stem from the monopoly that officials exert over administrative decisions that affect the
utility of other agents in the economy. This implies that, in order to monetize over these rents,
officials will need to collude with these agents.
Some related considerations apply to firms. Although payment of bribes in exchange for
favors is always an option, this is criminally sanctioned. In addition, to the extent that imper-
fections exist in the labor market, firms might have an incentive to hire politicians’ relatives
rather than paying bribes and appropriate part of the rents that stem from such imperfections.
We also speculate that nepotism is a - potentially inferior - substitute for sheer corruption:
when corruption and grafting are costly due to high rates of detection, politicians exchange
favors with firms in order to monetize over their position of power, although this possibly
comes at the cost some rent dissipation or rent sharing with firms. This is reminiscent of Olken
(2007), who shows that increased corruption monitoring in Indonesia leads to lower corruption
but higher nepotistic hiring in publicly funded projects. Again, although our data do not allow
us to provide definite evidence on this, we observe that nepotism is more widespread in areas
where corruption is more widespread.24
Others might object that firms unilaterally - as opposed to a result of an exchange - decide
to hire politicians’ relatives, in hope or expectation of deriving a private utility from it, perhaps
because these gives access to information that is not publicly available and is valuable to the
firm. Appointment or election of a family member to office might also serve as an information
revelation mechanism about a family’s - and hence a worker’s - quality. Although we cannot
definitely rule out these alternative explanations, it still remains true that our estimates mea-
sure the wider returns to holding office and hence that individuals might be seeking office in
expectation of such returns.
Our estimates clearly only refer to nepotism along family lines and exclude other forms of
interference with the hiring decisions of private firms on the part of public officials through
favoring of “friends” or other associates, including political associates. Also, given the nature
of the data, we are unable to measure nepotistic hiring in the public sector or other benefits that
accrue to public officials’ family members in self-employment. In this sense, our estimates are
likely to provide a lower bound for the true effect of nepotism on the labor market and they
obviously ignore other margins of inefficiency due to the diversion of resources that are likely
24 To come to this conclusion we have examined the coefficient on corruption crime rates in model 4.3. The
coefficient is consistently negative across specifications and statistically significant at conventional levels.
Clearly, one has to be cautious in attaching a causal interpretation to this coefficient.
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to result from such practices.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics, workers - employment spells
Mean s.d.
Months of work in the year 9.985 3.377
Yearly earnings 19,521.181 16,502.090
Number of jobs in the year 1.188 0.500
Female 0.327 0.469
Age 37.395 11.115
Area of birth: North 0.461 0.499
Area of birth: Center 0.173 0.378
Area of birth: South + Islands 0.366 0.482
Area of residence: North 0.545 0.498
Area of residence: Center 0.194 0.395
Area of residence: South + Islands 0.261 0.439
City of residence same as birth 0.402 0.490
Province of residence same as birth 0.735 0.441
Region of residence same as birth 0.817 0.387
Area of work: North 0.556 0.497
Area of work: Center 0.196 0.397
Area of work: South + Islands 0.248 0.432
Province of work same as birth 0.681 0.466
Region of work same as birth 0.788 0.409
Blue collar 0.639 0.480
White collar 0.349 0.477
Executive 0.011 0.102
N. observations 9,467,981
N. individuals 925,211
Notes. Each observation in the table is one year X individual, and the sample refers to observations with non-zero
earnings. Job characteristics refer to the most highly paying job in the year. Categories of variables might not add
up to one due to missing values. Yearly earnings are expressed in 2005 euros. Source: INPS data.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics, politicians
Mean s.d.
Municipal 0.961 0.194
Provincial 0.024 0.154
Regional 0.008 0.090
National 0.007 0.080
Council 0.699 0.459
Executive 0.301 0.459
1 Term 0.702 0.457
2 Terms 0.209 0.407
> 2 Terms 0.089 0.284
In office in 1985 0.293 0.455
Female 0.138 0.345
Age 44.389 11.267
Primary 0.099 0.299
Junior High 0.241 0.428
High School 0.411 0.492
College 0.247 0.431
Blue collar 0.159 0.366
White Collar 0.338 0.473
Manager 0.080 0.271
Military/Police 0.006 0.078
Physician 0.053 0.225
Professor/Teacher 0.066 0.248
Lawyer/Judge 0.023 0.149
Other occupation 0.060 0.238
Area of birth: North 0.548 0.498
Area of birth: Center 0.137 0.344
Area of birth: South + Islands 0.316 0.465
Area of election: North 0.572 0.495
Area of election: Center 0.137 0.343
Area of election: South + Islands 0.291 0.454
Munic. of election same as birth 0.485 0.500
Province of election same as birth 0.845 0.362
Region of election same as birth 0.917 0.276
N. observations 3,714,808
N. individuals 525,500
Notes. Each observation in the table is one year X government X individual. Data are weighted by
fraction of year in office. Categories of variables might not add up to one due to missing values.
Municipality of office only available for municipal politicians. Province of office only available for
municipal and provincial politicians. Region of office only available for municipal, provincial and
regional politicians. Source: Ministry of Interior Affairs.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics, matched sample
Mean s.d.
Months in work in the year 4.841 5.516
Employed 0.485 0.500
Yearly earnings 9,292.581 14,591.780
Total politicians 0.411 0.966
Total politician > 0 0.264 0.441
Total politicians = 1 0.170 0.376
Total politicians = 2 0.054 0.227
Total politicians > 2 0.039 0.195
Municipal politicians 0.388 0.931
Provincial politicians 0.013 0.114
Regional politicians 0.005 0.070
National politicians 0.004 0.063
Council politicians 0.297 0.746
Executive politicians 0.114 0.394
N. observations 17,117,062
N. individuals 806,085
Notes. Each observation in the table is one year X individual. The data include both employment and non-
employment spells. Workers and politicians matched on F3C and municipality of birth. See also notes to Tables 1
and 2.
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Table 4: Distribution of last names and F3Cs, individual tax records 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Frequency Pop. share Pop. w/same Pop. w/same Number of last
of occurrence F3C F3C and names by F3C and
Occurrences municipality of residence municipality of residence
Last names
All 525,054 1.000 5,112 72
More than 1 320,221 0.995 5,139 72
More than 5 192,449 0.985 5,190 73
More than 100 50,007 0.887 5,758 80
More than 100,000 1 0.003 133,812 755
F3C
All 9,496 1.000 78,562 373 3
More than 1 8,878 1.000 78,563 373 3
More than 5 7,860 1.000 78,570 373 3
More than 100 4,503 0.997 78,801 374 3
More than 100,000 67 0.281 188,427 813 7
More than 300,000 4 0.033 325,703 1,211 10
Notes. The top panel of the table reports the distribution of last names in Italy by nationwide occurrence based on 2005 tax data. Column (1)
reports the frequency of last names. Column (2) the associated population shares. Column (3) the number of individuals with the same last
name in the entire country and column (4) the number of individuals with the same last name and municipality of residence. The bottom panel
reports similar statistics to those in the top panel for the first three consonants of last names (F3C). Column (5) additionally reports the number
of last names by F3C and municipality of residence. See also Section 2.4.
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Table 5: Main estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. variable: Yearly earnings
Politicians 378.638*** 205.229*** 114.637*** 111.634***
(63.725) (14.883) (10.828) (12.170)
Politicians in 116.744***
(12.561)
Politicians out -9.590
(11.482)
Dep. variable: Months of work in the year
Politicians 0.095*** 0.117*** 0.054*** 0.037***
(0.021) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Politicians in 0.039***
(0.005)
Politicians out -0.009**
(0.004)
Munic. birth X F3C FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov. birth X year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indiv. controls Yes Yes Yes
Indiv. FE Yes Yes
Notes. Columns (1) to (4) of the table report the coefficients on the number of individuals in office (in any level of
government and in any office) with the same F3C and municipality of birth. Individual controls include age-group
dummies (in ten year bands) and a female dummy. Column (5) reports separate estimates for politicians’ entry
into and exit from office. Standard errors clustered by municipality of birth in brackets. Number of observations
17,117,062. ***, **, *: denote significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent level , respectively.
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Table 6: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ever connected Add individual Add Add Add
only linear trends 8-yrs FE 4-yrs FE 2-yrs FE
Dep. variable: Yearly earnings
Politicians 87.599*** 110.320*** 57.653*** 38.625*** 30.586****
(11.015) (12.420) (8.157) (6.460) (7.733)
Dep. variable: Months of work in the year
Politicians 0.031*** 0.037*** 0.029*** 0.020*** 0.011***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) )
Notes. The table reports regressions similar to those in column (4) of Table 5. Column (1) excludes families never connected to a politician.
Column (2) includes linear time trends interacted with individual fixed effects. Columns (3) to (5) include respectively 8-years (1985-1992,
1993-2010, etc.), 4-years (1985-1989, 1990-1994, etc.), and 2-years (1985-1986, 1987-1988 etc.) dummies interacted with individual fixed
effects. Column (6) adds municipality of birth X year fixed effects. Number of observations: 9,291,102; 17,117,062; 17,061,005; 17,002,333;
16,222,848 respectively in columns (1) to (5). See also notes to Table 5.
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Table 7: Heterogeneous effects by workers’ characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
By occupation By age
Blue collar White collar Manager
Dep. variable: Yearly earnings
Politicians 44.499*** 36.615*** 26.760*** 72.007***
(6.461) (8.011) (7.220) (26.119)
Politicians X age 26-35 123.223***
(30.880)
Politicians X age 36-45 86.130*
(45.397)
Politicians X age 46-55 71.175
(44.520)
Politicians X age 56-65 -297.789***
(61.825)
Avg dep. variable. 4,804 4,014 453
Dep. variable: Months of work in the year
Politicians 0.029*** 0.006** 0.002** 0.097***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.011)
Politicians X age 26-35 -0.012
(0.015)
Politicians X age 36-45 -0.082***
(0.014)
Politicians X age 46-55 -0.091***
(0.014)
Politicians X age 56-65 -0.109***
(0.016)
Avg. 3.11 1.67 0.05
Notes. The table reports regressions similar to those in column (4) of Table 5 where the effects are
allowed to vary by workers’ characteristics. Avg. is the mean value of the dependent variable for
each occupation. See also notes to Table 5.
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Table 8: Heterogeneous effects by politicians’ characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
By level of office By tenure By level of government
Dep. variable: Yearly earnings
Council 98.026***
(12.553)
Head + Executive 149.881***
(23.794)
1 Term 104.581***
(11.395)
2 Terms 180.809***
(21.603)
> 2 Terms 347.698***
(41.929)
Municipal 114.183***
(12.560)
Provincial 61.252
(50.560)
Regional 188.085**
(92.365)
National -70.545
(123.679)
Dep. variable: Months of work in the year
Council 0.034***
(0.005)
Head + Executive 0.045***
(0.008)
1 Term 0.038***
(0.004)
2 Terms 0.054***
(0.007)
> 2 Terms 0.083***
(0.014)
Municipal 0.037***
(0.005)
Provincial 0.044***
(0.017)
Regional -0.005
(0.032)
National 0.047
(0.046)
Notes. The table reports regressions similar to those in column (4) of Table 5 where the effects are allowed to
vary by politicians’ characteristics. Regressions in column (2) additionally include the number of left censored
observations (individuals in office in 1985) by F3C and municipality. See also notes to Table 5.
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Table 9: Discretionary spending and nepotism
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. variable: Yearly earnings
Discretionary spending per politician (log) 190.078*** 247.962*** 331.759***
(58.550) (67.610) (78.663)
Dep. variable: Months of work in the year
Discretionary spending per politician (log) 0.064** 0.091*** 0.140***
(0.027) (0.031) (0.036)
Additional controls No Yes Yes
Province FE No No Yes
Notes. The table reports minimum distance estimates of the effect of log discretionary spending per politician on
the extent of nepotism by municipality. Regressions refer to municipal politicians only. Method of estimation:
GLS, with weights equal to the square of the reciprocal of the standard error associated to each coefficient. Ad-
ditional controls include: log income per capita, log number of firms per capita, fraction of workers in the public
sector, local unemployment rate, log total number of politicians, log local population, fraction of the population
with a college degree, fraction of the population that is past working age, dummies for whether a municipality is a
region or province capital, for whether it has a police station (separately for the three police forces in Italy, Cara-
binieri, State Police and Guardia di Finanza) and for whether this is the site of a judicial court, turnout in local
elections, log number of non-profit associations per capita and a dummy for whether the municipal administration
was ever dissolved for Mafia. See also text for details.
31
Figure 1: Event-study analysis: Yearly earnings - entry
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Notes. The figure displays estimated yearly earnings at different lags and leads since
the time of first entry (denoted by a vertical line). All coefficients expressed relative
to effect in year before entry. 95 percent confidence intervals reported. See text for
detail.
Figure 2: Event-study analysis: Yearly earnings - exit
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Notes. The figure displays estimated yearly earnings at different lags and leads since
the time of last exit (denoted by a vertical line). All coefficients expressed relative to
effect in year after exit. 95 percent confidence intervals reported. See text for detail.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Measurement error
As said, in the data we only have an imperfect measure of political connections. This provides
an error-ridden measure of PiFmt . In particular, we can only identify politicians carrying the
same F3C and born in the same municipality as a worker. In formulas, we only observe:
PˆFmt =∑
j
siFm j pol jt
where siFm j is a dummy equal to one if individuals i and j have the same F3C F and are born
in the same municipality m. It follows that:
PˆFmt = PiFmt +νiFmt
where
νiFmt =∑
j
(siFm j−diFm j)pol jt
and diFm j is a dummy equal to one if individual i with F3C F is a family member of individual
j. It follows that our empirical model is:
yiFmt = α+β PˆFmt +uiFmt
where uiFmt = εiFmt−βνiFmt .
From the above one can derive the implied bias in the OLS estimate of β . Assuming that
siFm j and diFm j are independent across j’s, this estimate converges in probability to βk, where:
k = 1−Cov(Pˆ,ν)
Var(Pˆ)
= 1−Cov(s,s−d)
Var(s)
=
Cov(s,d)
Var(s)
Since:
Cov(s,d) = Pr(s = 1,d = 1)−Pr(s = 1)Pr(d = 1) =
[Pr(d = 1|s = 1)−Pr(d = 1|s = 0)]Pr(s = 0)Pr(s = 1)
and
Var(s) = Pr(s = 0)Pr(s = 1)
it follows that:
k = 1−Pr(d = 1|s = 0)−Pr(d = 0|s = 1)
At given Pr(s = 1) and Pr(d = 1), k is lower the higher are both type-1, Pr(s = 0|d = 1),
and type-2, Pr(s = 1|d = 0), errors. Since k varies between -1 and 1, estimates of β are bound
between −β and β . The intuition for this is straightforward. Type-1 error and type-2 errors
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imply respectively that connected individuals are erroneously assigned to the control group,
and unconnected individuals are assigned to the treatment group, both diluting the estimate
of β . In the extreme case when all connected individuals are assigned to the control group
and all unconnected individuals are assigned to the treatment group, the estimates of β will be
reverted.
The size of both errors will depend on the distribution of F3Cs in a municipality and there
is a clear tradeoff between the two. To see this, consider the simple case where the number of
genuinely related individuals (d = 1) with and without F3C F born in the same municipality m
is the same across households (respectively D and D). In this case:
k = 1−E
(
D
NFm
)
−E
(
NFm−D
NFm
)
(A.1)
where NFm and NFm are respectively the number of individuals with and without F3C F in
municipality m. One can hence use the simulated number of relatives with the same and with
a different F3C born in the same municipality (see Appendix A.2), and the total number of
individuals by F3C and municipality (see Section 2.4), to derive an estimate of k.25
A.2. Number of family members in the same municipality and with the
same F3C: simulations
In this appendix we derive a range of estimates for the number of working age family members
with and without the same last name (and hence presumably the same F3C as it is unlikely that
family members with different last names have the same F3C) born in the same municipality,
D and D, under a variety of assumptions about the number of children across generations and
geographical mobility. We assume that women carry their father’s last name (rather than their
husband’s last name), as the Italian tax code is calculated based on last name at birth, and by
and large female politicians use the last name at birth. We focus on a middle-age politician,
somebody whose children, siblings, n-th cousins and all their children are of working age,
while excluding the parents’ generation.
Assuming C children by generation (C ≥ 1), each individual will have C children, plus
2n(C− 1)Cn n-th cousins and 2n(C− 1)Cn+1 n-th cousins’ children (n-th cousins once re-
moved) from both parents’ sides. For n = 0 these formulas provide the number of siblings
and nephews/nieces.26
To derive the fraction carrying one’s last name, we assume a balanced sex ratio. While fathers
transfer their last name to daughters, mothers do not. Clearly, the probability of a child carrying
a parent’s last name is 12 (1 if the parent is male, and 0 if female). Among one’s n-th cousins,
25 As type-1 error is on average negligible, a simplified expression for k that we end up using is k = E
(
D
NFm
)
.
26 For example, if 3 children are born across generations, each individual will have 3 children, 20(3− 1)30 = 2
siblings, 20(3− 1)31 = 6 nephews/nieces, 2(3− 1)31 = 12 first cousins, and 2(3− 1)32 = 36 first cousins’
children.
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the fraction of those carrying one’s last name is 122n , while among n-th cousin’s children this
fraction is 122n+1 .
27
To derive the number of family members with the same last name born in the same mu-
nicipality, we assume very simply that the probability of being born in the same municipality
as one’s parent is p, and that the probability of being born in the same municipality as one’s
siblings is 1. We also assume that both parents are born in the same municipality, and that the
probability of being born in the same municipality as one’s ancestor of generation g is pg. It
follows that the probability of an n-th cousin being born in one’s municipality is p2n, while for
an n-th cousin’s children this probability is p2n+1.28
We can make some assumptions on the value of C and p in order to derive reasonable esti-
mates of one’s family members born in the same municipality. We assume a rate of geographi-
cal mobility between 0.35 and 0.75, i.e., a probability p of being born in the same municipality
as one’s parent between 0.25 and 0.65.29 We also assume a number of children by generation
varying between 1 and 3.
In Figure A.7 we report the simulated number of close consanguineal family members (chil-
dren, siblings, nephews/nieces, first cousins and their children) born in the same municipality.
Clearly, this number increases with both p and C and it varies considerably: from less than
1 when mobility is high and the number of children is small, to around 22 when mobility is
low and the number of children is high. On average, assuming a uniform distribution across
the range of variation in p and C, we would expect 6 close consanguineal relatives in one’s
municipality of birth.
In Figure A.8 we report the number of close family members (brothers, sisters, first cousins,
and their children) born in one’s municipality of birth and sharing the same last name. This
number varies between 0 and 7. On average one would expect 2.4 close consanguineal relatives
born in the same municipality.30
27 This specializes to 1 for siblings and 12 for nephews/nieces, while this is
1
4 for first cousins (the children of one’s
father’s brothers) and 18 for first cousins’ children (the children of male cousins carrying one’s last name).
28 For example, this probability is 1 with respect to a sibling and p with respect to a nephew/niece, as s/he will
have a probability p of being born where one of his parents (i.e., one’s sibling, and hence the individuals
himself) was born. The probability of two first cousins being born in the same municipality is p2, as this is
the joint probability that the children of two brothers are born in the same municipality. Similarly, for first
cousins’ children this probability is p3.
29 Data from the 2001 Italian Population Census show that around 45-50 percent of individuals live in one munici-
pality of birth, with this number being roughly constant across generations (and slightly lower for women, who
are typically tied movers). Assuming that children are born in one’s municipality of residence, this provides a
rough estimate for p.
30 We can similarly derive estimates of the number of consanguineal family members carrying a different last
name, D. As in practice these individuals account for a very small fraction of those classified as unrelated, i.e.,
because the last term in equation (A.1) is close to zero (see footnote 25), for brevity we do not report these
simulations.
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A.3. Selection bias
One final concern that arises is related to the structure of the data, which is made of individuals
with at least one social security spell over the period. Model estimates are at risk of suffering
from selection bias.
To quantify the overall bias, let us start from our model in equation (4.2):
yiFmt = α+βPFmt +uiFmt (A.2)
where we ignore the measurement error issue (see Section A.1).
Let Ai = {Maxt=1,..T (yiFmt) > 0} define the event that determines inclusion in the sample,
with the associated complementary event Bi = {yiFm1 < 0,yiFm2 < 0, ..,yiFmT < 0}, such that
Pr(Ai = 1|F,m) = 1−Pr(Bi = 1|F,m).
Let:
WFm =
Pr(Bi = 1|F,m)
1−Pr(Bi = 1|F,m)
Given the selection rule, we only observe the empirical counterpart to:
E(yiFmt |Ai = 1,F,m, t) = α+βPFmt +hFmt
where hFmt =−E(uiFmt |Bi = 1,F,m, t)WFm and we have exploited the fact that:
E(uiFmt |Ai = 1,F,m, t) =−E(uiFmt |Bi = 1,F,m, t)WFm
which follows from the assumption that E(uiFmt |F,m, t) = 0. Assuming independence of uiFmt
across time within individuals, it follows:
hFmt =−E(uiFmt |uiFmt <−α−βPFmt)
(
ΠsPr(uiFms <−α−βPFms)
1−ΠsPr(uiFms <−α−βPFms)
)
Although the sign of the bias is indeterminate absent further assumptions on the distribution
of u, it is easy to show that the bias tends to disappear as T grows, as ΠsPr(uiFms < −α −
βPFms), and hence WFm, are likely to become small as T increases. This is simply because the
more observations there are for an individual, the less likely is that this individual will not have
a positive draw of yiFmt in any given time period, and hence will not be included in the sample.
This can also be directly tested using data. One can use information on the underlying
population (from the tax data, see Section 2.4) and the number of politicians by family (from the
politicians’ data, see Section 2.2) to test whether the probability of inclusion in the INPS sample
(i.e., the fraction of individuals with a given F3C in each municipality in the INPS data over the
number of people in the population) is correlated with the vector PFm = PFm1,PFm2, ...,PFmT .31
31 Around 5 percent of families in the INPS or politicians data do not appear in the tax data. This slight discrep-
ancy is most likely due to the fact that while the tax data report municipality of residence, the workers and
politicians’ data report municipality of birth.
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We have regressed this fraction on the vector PFm using GLS with weights given by the
number of individuals in each cell in the tax data. We also include in the model F3C plus
municipality effects. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. The regressions include 3.9
million observations. Estimated coefficients with associated 95 percent confidence intervals are
reported in Figure A.9. No clear pattern is detectable in the data, with some coefficients being
positive and other negative and hardly ever individually significant.
A.4. Municipality characteristics
In this section we describe the municipal-level variables that we use in Table 9 (see also Table
A.1 for descriptive statistics).
Discretionary exp.: municipal expenditure excluding debt service and personnel per year (in
2000 euros), average between 1993 and 2004 (source, Ministry of Interior Affairs).
Income per capita: personal income as of 2005 (source, Ministry of Interior Affairs).
Firms: number of productive activities registered to the Chamber of Commerce as of 2005
(source, Ministry of Interior Affairs).
Pct. unemployment: municipal unemployment rate as of 2013 (source, Istat). Computed
as a projection, based on census data, of the unemployment rate at Local Labor District level
(Sistemi Locali del Lavoro) at the municipal level.
Pct. public sector employment: share of public sector employment as of 2001 (2001 Popu-
lation Census).
Pct. college: percentage of the resident population 6-years old and over with a college
degree or more as of 2011 (source, 2011 Population Census). Elderly index: ratio of resident
population above 65 over population below 14 as of 2005 (source, Ministry of Interior Affairs).
Population: resident population as of 2001 (source, 2001 Population Census).
Region capital: dummy indicating if the municipality holds the regional government seat.
Province capital: dummy indicating if the municipality holds the provincial government
seat.
CC station: dummy indicating if the municipality hosts at least one Carabinieri station as of
2015 (source, IPA Indice delle Pubbliche Amministrazioni).
PS station: dummy indicating if the municipality hosts at least one Polizia di Stato station as
of 2015 (source, IPA Indice delle Pubbliche Amministrazioni).
GDF station: dummy indicating if the municipality hosts at least one Guardia di Finanza
station as of 2015 (source, IPA Indice delle Pubbliche Amministrazioni).
Court: dummy indicating if the municipality hosts a court as of 2015 (source, Ministry of
Justice).
Subsidiary court: dummy indicating if the municipality hosts a subsidiary court as of 2015
(source, Ministry of Justice).
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Crime per capita: total number of crimes reported to the judiciary authority per 1,000 indi-
viduals, average between 2004 and 2009 (source, Istat).
Corruption crimes per capita: total number of corruption crimes reported to the judiciary
authority per 1,000 individuals, average between 2004 and 2009 (source, Istat).
Municipal government dissolved for Mafia: dummy indicating if the municipal government
was ever (i.e., since 1991) dissolved due to Mafia infiltration (source, Ministry of Interior Af-
fairs).
Non-profit organizations: number of non-profit organizations (voluntary associations, so-
cial cooperatives and foundations, excluding church based organizations) in the municipality
(source, 2011 Population Census).
Politicians: total number of available seats in the council and in the executive, average be-
tween 1985 and 2011 (source, Ministry of Interior Affairs). The number of elected municipal
officials varies discontinuously with population size (see Gagliarducci and Nannicini 2013),
from 12 councilors and 4 executives in municipalities with less than 3,000 inhabitants, to 50-60
councilors and 14-16 executives in cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants.
Voters’ turnout: percentage of voters over total registered voters in municipal elections, av-
erage between 1993 and 2010 (source, Ministry of Interior Affairs).
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Table A.1: Municipality characteristics
Mean s.d.
Discretionary exp. per politician (log) 11.540 0.926
Income per capita (log) 9.480 0.228
Firms per capita (log) -2.623 0.328
Pct. unemployment 12.247 6.074
Pct. public sector employment 9.704 9.023
Pct. college 7.400 2.708
Elderly index 185.158 149.213
Population (log) 7.949 1.252
Region capital 0.003 0.053
Province capital 0.016 0.127
CC station 0.478 0.500
PS station 0.044 0.205
GDF station 0.063 0.244
Court 0.019 0.138
Subsidiary court 0.034 0.181
Crimes per (1,000) capita 0.028 0.021
Corruption crimes per (1,000) capita 0.001 0.020
Municipality dissolved for Mafia 0.026 0.159
Non-profit organizations per (1,000) capita (log) 1.490 0.606
Pct. voters’ turnout 79.546 8.049
Politicians per capita (log) -4.947 1.032
Notes. Number of observations: 7,182. See Section A.4 for a description of the variables and
sources.
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Figure A.1: Event-study analysis: Months of work - entry
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Notes. The figure displays the estimated number of months of work at different lags
and leads since the time of first entry (denoted by a vertical line). All coefficients
expressed relative to effect in year before entry. 95 percent confidence intervals re-
ported. See text for detail.
Figure A.2: Event-study analysis: Months of work - exit
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Years to/from event
Notes. The figure displays the estimated number of months of work at different lags
and leads since the time of last exit (denoted by a vertical line). All coefficients
expressed relative to effect in year after exit. 95 percent confidence intervals reported.
See text for detail.
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Figure A.3: Event-study analysis: Number of family members in office - entry
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Notes. The figure displays the estimated number of family members in office in each
year at different lags and leads since the time of first entry (denoted by a vertical line).
All coefficients expressed relative to effect in year before entry. 95 percent confidence
intervals reported. See text for detail.
Figure A.4: Event-study analysis: Number of family members in office - exit
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Notes. The figure displays the estimated number of family members in office in each
year at different lags and leads since the time of last exit (denoted by a vertical line).
All coefficients expressed relative to effect in year after exit. 95 percent confidence
intervals reported. See text for detail.
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Figure A.5: Heterogeneous effects by sector of activity: Yearly earnings
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Notes. The figure displays the proportional increase due to nepotism, by sector. 95
percent confidence intervals reported. See text for detail.
Figure A.6: Heterogeneous effects by sector of activity: Months of work
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Notes. The figure displays the proportional increase due to nepotism, by sector. 95
percent confidence intervals reported. See text for detail.
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Figure A.7: Simulated number of close consanguineal relatives born in one’s municipality
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Notes. The figure displays the simulated number of close family members (children
plus siblings, first cousins and their children) born in one’s municipality. See text for
detail.
Figure A.8: Simulated number of close consanguineal relatives born in one’s municipality and
carrying one’s last name
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Notes. The figure displays the simulated number of close family members (children
plus siblings, first cousins and their children) born in one’s municipality and carrying
one’s last name. See text for detail.
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Figure A.9: Testing for selection
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Notes. The figure reports the estimated coefficients and the associated 99 percent
confidence intervals from a regression of the fraction of individuals in the INPS data
by cell (F3C X municipality of birth) on the number of politicians per cell in each
year between 1985 and 2011. Regressions include F3C plus municipality of birth
fixed effects and are weighted by the size of each cell. Standard errors clustered by
municipality of birth. See also Appendix A.3.
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